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Collective Bargaining 
in the Public Sector: 
Prince Edward Island 
G. K. Cowan 
The author reports on Prince Edward Island's attempt to 
solve some of the key issues of public sector bargaining through 
Us récent collective bargaining régulations for teachers and the 
public service. 
INTRODUCTION 
Collective Bargaining in the public sector may be at an historié 
turning point. This paper accepts Dr. Fred Carrothers' contention l that 
public acceptance of collective bargaining for tax-supported employées 
and for institutions and utilities, where the burden of strike action is born 
more heavily the public than by the participants is waning. The problem 
is accentuated as public pay levels are now reaching, and occasionally 
surpassing, private levels set by the market place. 
An attempt to solve some of the key issues has been made in Prince 
Edward Island's récent collective bargaining régulations for teachers and 
the public service. A spécial preparatory study by the Chairman of the 
P.E.I. Labour Relations Board2 challenged the parties to action and 
raised important questions. Plan-
ners then drew heavily from Ottawa 
fédéral problems, some new Amer-
ican3 arbitration experiments, but 
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1 (a) A. W. R. CARROTHERS, Président, University of Calgary, « Industrial 
Relations in a New Environment», presented to Business Outlook Conférence, The 
Conférence Board, Ottawa, October 2, 1972. 
(b) Editorial, « Slowly Towards Arbitration », The Globe and Mail, Toronto, 
October 30, 1973, B2. 
2 J. J. REVELL, University of Prince Edward Island, « Collective Bargaining 
in the Public Service of Prince Edward Island», December, 1971. 
3 (a) Arvid ANDERSON, Chairman, Office of Collective Bargaining, New 
York City, « Impact of Bargaining in the Public Service », Wisconsin Law Review, 
December, 1973. 
(b) Act. No. 312, Michigan Public Acts, 1969. 
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especially from the long expérience of the British public service4, the 
Tennessee Valley Authority5, and more recently, New Zealand's expéri-
ence 6 in negotiating comparability with private sector rates. 
Preliminary studies of the Fédéral scène showed, the importance of 
another historié turning point in 1967, when an Ottawa Parliament turned 
away from the essential éléments of the British public service model which 
had been partially recommended in the 1965 Heeney Report, 7 and which 
was being sought after through the 1950 s by most fédéral employée 
organizations. Instead, the legislators adopted the Public Service Staff 
Relations Act which embodies the basic, adversary power-struggle concept 
of private sector collective bargaining on the apparent assumption that 
there are no major différences between the public and private areas. 
Parliament's action, however, may hâve been less of a turning point 
than the power-struggle attitudes and administration policies followed by 
the Civil Service managers, as observed by the author, and in line with 
observations from the private sector8. Prior to acrual bargaining, a sharp, 
'divide the sides' policy was pursued with haste, arbitrarily splitting 
management up the middle to establish contending adversaries. Many 
longstanding, effective working relationships within departments began 
4
 (a) Staff Relations in the Civil Service, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 
London, England, 1965. 
(b) «The National Whitley Council — The First Fifty Years », Civil Service 
Department, London, England, Mardi, 1969. 
(c) J.D. THOMAS, Fifty Years of Whitleyism in the Review, Department 
of Inland Revenue, London, England, 1970. 
(d) Inland Revenue Departmental Council, Staff Side, Report for 1972, De-
partment of Inland Revenue, London, England, 1972. 
(e) James L. STERN, « Bargaining and Arbitration in the British Civil Service ». 
Monthly Labour Review, U.S. Department of Labour, August, 1973, pages 61-63. 
5
 (a) Louis J. VAN MOL, « The T.V.A. Expérience », Collective Bargaining 
in the Public Service, Theory and Practice, Public Service Association, Chicago, 1967, 
pages 85-94. 
(b) John E. MASSEY, «Labour-Management Co-Operation in T.V.A. », Public 
Personnel Review, July, 1965 
6 Salary and Wage Fixing Procédures in the New Zealand State Services — 
Reports of the Royal Commission of lnquiry, Government Printer, Wellington, Zea-
land, August, 1968 and June, 1972. 
7
 Preparatory Committee on Collective Bargaining, Queen's printer, Ottawa, 
1965. (The Heeney Report). 
8 G. K. COWAN, P.E.I. Institute of Industrial Relations, The Relevance of 
Communications and Behavioural Knowledge to Labour Management Relations — 
A New Route, Task Force On Labour Relations, Devember, 1968, revised 1972. 
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deteriorating and reports currently received suggest that employée alién-
ation is increasing. 
In August, 1966, George Davidson, then Secretary to the Treasury, 
said openly that « up to that time » there had not been a « sharp cleavage » 
between « the interests of management » and the « interests of employées » 
but the line of démarcation would become increasingly sharp « as collective 
bargaining matures », which would be both « increasingly apparent » and 
« necessary ». « I am not for a moment suggesting that this is a bad thing, 
an unfortunate thing.. .» he added, indicating government policy. 
Treasury Board proceeded to hire considérable numbers of expe-
rienced industrial relations executives from the private sector, who, of 
course, accepted the full implications of a power-struggle system, as they 
had experienced it. Results were predicable. One example : during the 
early organizing stages, an employée représentative requested from a 
department manager, with whom he had long held a working relationship, 
the names of department employées who were dues-paying members of 
his union. This would save the union considérable administrative expense 
in tracking down people who had moved about. The manager's willingness 
was nullifield by a Treasury Board directive. It was the beginning of 
aliénation in that Department. 
The National Joint Council, a joint consultative body, was also 
downgraded in the beginning on the assumption that the bargaining table 
would replace consultation. On the other side, only a minority of employée 
leaders apparently sought a total private sector approach. Nor did ail 
managers, even to this day, follow the 'split-the-sides' policy in practice-
It can be said, I believe, that today's growing militancy was not the 
gênerai désire of overall public service membership (nor is it yet) if 
such had been measured, but the resuit of a small minority of « expert » 
opinion at the top. 
P.E.I.'s situation of two years ago closely reflected Ottawa, of the 
early and pre-1960's. Teachers', public servants' and nurses' associations 
each sought rights to negociate wages and salaries. Each group asked 
for a system which would not use the strike weapon to résolve disputes, 
but would nevertheless insure fair and acceptable settlements. The go-
vernment, while willing to enter the modem era of collective bargaining 
with its employées, sought answers to problems seen in other public sec-
tors. 
A spécial Cabinet Committee began meeting with ail concerned to 
find answers to such questions as : Could government risk leaving public 
pay décisions to an arbitrator ? Would current good working relations and 
efficiency be impaired ? Was there an answer to Ottawa's quarrels over 
management exclusions, and the maintenance of full management control 
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over classifications and other items ? And from a growing public concern, 
was there an alternative to the strike ? The Committee's Chairman, issued 
a public paper entitled « Fair Comparison Arbitration — A Workable 
Solution to Public Service Strikes » 9 on policy considérations. 
Détails for the Régulations governing bargaining were then worked 
out by Joint Committees from the concerned parties. 
P. E. I. REGULATIONS FOR BARGAINING 
By voluntary agreement of both parties the Régulations for nego-
tiations require that either party, following a breakdown in negotiations 
and conciliation, shall submit unresolved différences to an independent 
arbitrator or board for a binding décision. The arbitrator, however, is 
required to make his décision on the basis of certain definite criteria. 
Hère lies one basic différence between the P.E.I. and U.K. Systems and 
that of Ottawa. A P.E.I. arbitrator must give « priority » to pay and other 
benefits currently available for comparable jobs among the better paying 
employers — with suitable size and modem employée relations — of the 
private sector on Prince Edward Island. (For rationale for tax-supporting 
area comparisons see Newfoundland Commission Report) 10. Where no 
fair comparisons exist locally such as in a depressed area, the arbitrator 
looks to the other Maritime provinces, but must take into account the 
« varying économie capabilities » of the provinces including available 
Fédéral funds. In addition, where relevant, the arbitrator may also con-
sider the usual requirements to obtain and retain compétent public ser-
vants, to maintain appropriate internai pay relationships, etc. n . Thèse 
provisions were also designed for and did become the guidelines for 
negotiations. 
Thèse criteria provided the rationale which permitted government 
and the employée organizations to make sole use of an arbitrator for 
dispute seulement by trying to insure 'fair comparison' pay levels that 
could generally satisfy both employées and the public. They also altered 
the nature of negotiations since governmenfs committment through the 
régulations to pay up to the levels of the better private sector employers, 
coupled with an employée requirement to accept this limitation, removed 
the need for an ultimate power struggle and the lengthy bargaining dances 
9 Hon. Bruce STEWART, Ministre of Labour, Prince Edward Island, «Fair 
Comparison Arbitration — A Workable Solution to Public Service Strikes >, Con-
férence of Canadian Premiers, Halifax, August, 1972. 
10
 Report of the Royal Commission on Labour Législation in Newfoundland 
and Labrador, 1972, pages 498-9. 
u «Section 26, The Civil Service Act of Prince Edward Island, Amendment to 
Régulations, 'Consultation and Negotiating procédures' », November 22, 1972. 
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which naturally follow unlimited ceilings for demands and floors for offers. 
The much narrowed bargaining range brings greater ease and speed of 
seulement. This is the lesson of the T.V.A., New Zealand and, esp>ecially, 
the British expérience. 
WHY CRITERIA ? 
Why should such limitations be set for the public service ? First both 
management and employées of government exist for the purpose of pro-
viding a public service, and are not essentially in conflict as can be the 
case in the private sector where the management of a company is required 
to increase profit levels with which employées may be in conflict when 
seeking increased wages. The Third Annual Review of the Economie 
Council of Canada — 1966 12, establishes the need for setting a 'constraint' 
on public service incomes in order to match the Contraints' which the 
market system, for the most part, sets upon negotiations in private sector 
companies. A dissatisfied company, losing money, can go out of business, 
but no the government, or a utility. Governments and huge public service 
unions also can exercise enormous monopoly powers by combining the 
ultimate power to tax with the disastrous effect of strikes in key sectors. 
Unions hâve as great a vested interest as government in finding solutions 
to 'unlimited' public service power struggles. 
The Economie Council suggested that an appropriate 'constraint' 
for public service pay should be the current income levels of the « good 
employer » in the private sector for comparable work. (The Ottawa Act 
omits the word « good » ) . 
In addition, more than 80% of the Canadian work force is in the 
private sector indicating that the economy's, true 'ability to pay', which 
must be a fondamental considération of collective bargaining, is esta-
blished by the millions of daily market place décisions of the private 
sector, irrespective of government's overall économie rôle. It means, for 
example, that if a secretary in the public sector is paid significantly more 
than secretaries among the better paying employers of the private sector, 
those private secretaries will be taxed extra (regardless of how slight) in 
order to pay the public secretary extra money for doing the same work. 
THE STRIKE ISSUE 
Following the British pattern again, P.E.I.'s régulations make no 
mention of strikes, neither laid down procédures nor penalties. This 
silence is designed to throw full weight upon negotiations and arbitration 
12
 Third Annual Review, Economie Council of Canada, 1966, pages 181-2. 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PUBLIC SECTÔR. . . 205 
routes. It recognizes, however, that there could be aggravating circums-
tances which could cause a walkout. This would be dealt with by the 
government as an ad hoc issue, ascertaining the nature of the problem 
in order to effect a solution. It also implies that the 'fair comparison' 
and consultation procédures will be effective in resolving almost ail 
interest disputes, as has been the British expérience. Récent public 
service walkouts in the UK Civil service hâve been 'protests' to keep 
the System intact. 
This paper contends that strikes in the public service are an 'uneven' 
and 'unnecessary' method of solving gênerai économie disputes, providing 
that adéquate alternatives are available. A strike can only be used by those 
public employées where it can cause sufficient disruption to bring pres-
sure for settlement. Other public servants must use arbitration or settle 
on government terms. And if pressures from a strike increase substantiaUy, 
such as in the récent railway strike or last year's Québec public employée 
strikes, governments must respond by legislating employées back to work 
under some form of compulsory arbitration settlement. In our présent 
pubhc climate a public service strike in a key sector cannot continue to 
an ultimate économie end, which either closes down a business or forces 
one side or the other to bleed enough to settle. Alternatives are needed. 
PRIESTLEY REPORT 
The British 'Priestley' Royal Commission report of 1956 13 defines 
the pubhc and private pay relationship with spécial clarity. When a public 
employée earns what ne could earn working for a « good employer» 
outside the service, this will appear fair to both the tax payer and the 
employée. Priestley's emphasis that incomes must appear as well as be 
fair is critical. Through' fair comparability, pay, political leaders also can 
claim, properly, that the work of government is of equal importance to 
the work of the « good» (usually large) employer in the private sector, 
and that government must therefore obtain their fair share of good em-
ployées on the market. But to pay significantly more achieve an unequal 
share. 
THE EFFECT OF COMPARABILITY ON BARGAINING 
'Fair Comparability' calls for the establishment of the real pay levels 
for comparable jobs among the 'good' or 'better-paying' private employers. 
Priestley, therefore, recommended that employée organizations should 
be given a joint rôle in developing negotiating data. Ottawa's Pay Research 
Bureau grew, partly from this suggestion. But today it more closely re-
!3 Royal Commission on the Civil Service, 1953-5, (The Priestley Commission), 
Civil Service Department, London, England. 
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semblés the U.K. prior to their acceptance in 1956 of the 'good' employer 
définition, when British public service negotiators increasingly found 
themselves at the negotiating table with separate sets of facts indep»endent-
ly developed and far apart. One used the lower private pay levels, and 
the other the highest. A threatened breakdown of the System led to the 
Priestley Commission. 
In the présent U.K. System, a separate pay research unit, whose 
members are chosen after joint consultation, are directed by a « Steering 
Committee » of both parties to study a certain set of industries which has 
been agreed upon as most closely représentative of the Priestley définition 
for « good employers », ie. of suitable size with modem management 
methods and having consultation or negotiations with employée organi-
zations, a steady business pattern, etc. 
In one case examined, U.K. Pay Research was asked by the Steering 
Committee to pick ten out of some twenty-seven industries recommended 
for study. After study, Pay Research provides each side with exact pay 
and benefit figures for the classifications studied among the ten industries. 
Each side then makes out an average dollar (or pound) cost, and they 
meet to compare. When comparisons are exact, this becoms the seulement. 
Where they differ, a search is made for the point of différence, possibly 
a variant view of the value of an insurance plan, for example, and this 
is negotiated. 
A separate paper would be required to détail various problems and 
difficulties found, but the parties are committed to the System as the most 
workable they hâve seen. Some 500,000 British Public Servants are 
covered. 
Ottawa's power struggle system leads to a key variant in Pay Re-
search Bureau work. The Bureau's Advisory Committee is 'only' advisory, 
without a steering control as in Britain. The Bureau assumes that 'in-
telligent' men be able to settle through negotiations, and thus data is 
developed to cover a much wider range of pay rates than would be 
required by a clear définition of a « good » employer. 
At présent the system has led to each party picking figures from 
the Bureau (or not using any) which entirely support their own demand 
or offer. Resuit — increasingly both sides are looking upon data as a 
waste of time. Bargaining tends to become a power struggle or a waiting 
game. 
Ottawa's P.R.B. data dœs, hâve greater value when arbitration is 
required. Hère again, since no clear définition of a « good » employer 
is made the arbitrator has a wide range of sélection. The current strike 
of public service nurses against an arbitrator's décision may be one resuit. 
P.E.I. régulations require the parties to meet six months in advance 
of contract endings and either develop jointly or agrée upon the data 
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required, meeting again two months later to share data and corne to 
agreement on as many classifications as possible through consultation, 
before entering formai negotiations. On the first round of P.E.I. nego-
tiations, negotiators set up a joint committee of two from each side to 
collect data, once the implications of the Régulations were made clear. 
As soon as data was available, the committee recommended to the 
negotiators those figures which they had agreed (or disagreed) repre-
sented the most exact comparability figures available in accordance with 
the criteria. In most cases of nearly 500 classifications handled thèse 
figures were accepted by the negotiators. Areas of doubt, or judgment 
différences brought on negotiations few were difficult but since the 
boundaries had been narrowed, settlements proved to be within range. 
Where data was not available, jobs were interpolated between jobs with 
suitable data. 
Spécial problem of gathering data and insuring accurate job com-
parisons, however, plague ail of the Systems. There is also an assumption 
that governments should treat private and public sectors alike on in-
flationary and other gênerai questions. 
The author's récent three-week study in London of the British 
System showed its reliance not only on fair comparability criteria and 
acceptable arbitration, but on a highly effective communications and 
consultation process known as the Whitley Councils. 
Formai negotiations are confined primarily to financial items. Vir-
tually ail other working condition problems or new policies go into a 
thorough consultation procédure leading to joint agreement or to a 
'willingness' to experiment, before action is taken, by-passing the 'man-
agement rights' 'hassle' by voluntary action. Both parties agrée that time 
lost in consultation is more than made up for in employée acceptance 
and goodwill. Difficult and complex matters are also more readily 
resolved in this manner, than in the pressure cooker of negotiations. 
Prince Edward Island Régulations establish both Provincial and 
Departmental Joint Councils for similar purposes. 
ARBITRATION INFREQUENT 
In his récent study of the British Public Service System, Stern 
(4 [e]) notes, « The infrequency with which the parties hâve turned to 
arbitration in récent years to résolve their wage disputes contradicts the 
idea, widely held in the United States, (and Canada, éd.) that its 
availability upon the request of either party will hâve a 'narcotic effect' 
that is, it will lead the bargainers to rely more and more heavily upon 
arbitration instead of solving them directly by negotiations ». 
It is the judgement of this paper that the clarification of criteria is 
a major factor in making the above possible. It is especially interesting 
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that in the early 1960's both major fédéral public service associations 
combined, without success, to try and persuade the Fédéral Government 
to appoint a commission to study appropriate criteria to describe the 
'good employer' of the private sector for comparisons in negotiations. 
P.E.I. has adopted the U.K. approach on management exclusions. 
AU levels of management pay may be negotiated on a fair comparability 
basis, excepting those groups directly involved in negotiations for the 
government and the Deputy Ministers. Negotiating over his pay within 
an Association has not proved a déterrent to a manager assurning his 
managerial responsibilities while participating in negotiations over his 
classifications, either in the U.K., or in Ottawa's Professional Institute. 
It also fits well with modem behavioral approaches to managing8. 
CONCLUSION 
So far, the P.E.I. System has worked through three sets of negotia-
tions. Plans are being made to communicate a better understanding of 
the system and its values to managers and employées, and a joint review 
of the process will consider possible adjustments. 
An extension of fair comparability might also be considered in the 
public utility and transport areas. During the 1950's, railway disputes 
were settled almost entirely on the basis of comparable pay with the 'hard 
goods' industries. Why not again ? Vancouver teacher and school board 
also settle each year on a basis of changing rates in other B.C. sectors. 
In Ontario two commissions are studying the problem of finding an 
appropriate basis for comparing incomes between the private sector and 
two key public service units. 
Events in Ottawa, and other provinces, hâve not gone beyond the 
possibility of changing the system, if a fair and workable alternative is 
communicated effectively with employées. Otherwise, events may force 
direct législative actions. 
La négociation collective dans le secteur public : 
l'île du Prince-Edouard 
Les gens sont de plus en plus opposés aux grèves qui, dans le secteur public, 
semblent toucher davantage la population que les participants eux-mêmes. Ainsi, 
les comparaisons entre les taux de salaire qui sont payés dans les secteurs public et 
privé suscitent de plus en plus de critiques à mesure que les niveaux de traitement 
des employés du secteur public atteignent et dépassent ceux du secteur privé. L'un 
et l'autre doivent relever le défi en trouvant la solution opportune. 
La faiblesse du régime de négociation collective dans le secteur public, qu'il 
s'agisse du gouvernement fédéral, des provinces ou des municipalités, réside dans 
l'impuissance à reconnaître que le secteur public diffère du secteur privé. Le Conseil 
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économique du Canada a constaté que tant les négociateurs des organismes publics 
eux-mêmes que ceux de leurs employés sont soumis au même type de contraintes 
que celles que la concurrence des marchés fait peser sur les négociations collectives 
dans le recteur privé. Les gouvernements détiennent un pouvoir de taxer illimité et 
les syndicats des employés des services publics sont en mesure, du moins dans les 
secteurs-clés, de disloquer la vie économique, ce qui leur permet potentiellement 
d'obtenir de avantages inéquitables sur le secteur privé qui forme plus de quatre-
vingts pour cent de la main-d'œuvre et qui fournit la grande partie des impôts sur 
les revenus qui alimentent les bordereaux de paie de l'État. 
La nouvelle réglementation du gouvernement de l'île du Prince-Érouard en 
matière de négociations collectives pour ce qui concerne les enseignants et les fonc-
tionnaires s'inspire de critères suggérés par le Conseil économique et qui existent 
depuis longtemps dans la fonction publique en Grande-Bretagne, en Nouvelle-Zélande 
ainsi que dans le Tennessee Valley Act, etc. Les négociateurs et les arbitres doivent 
établir les taux de salaire des employés du secteur public de façon à les ajuster aux 
taux qui sont payés par les « bons » employeurs du secteur privé. L'île du Prince-
Edouard définit le « bon employeur » en parlant « des employeurs qui paient les 
meilleurs salaires » dans l'île. Si l'on tient compte des taux de salaire payés par les 
autres gouvernements des Maritimes, on tiendra également compte des différences 
économiques entre les provinces, tel le revenu disponible, par exemple, ainsi que 
d'autres facteurs comme la nécessité d'avoir un personnel compétent. 
De pareils critères modifient le concept de la force qui existe dans le secteur 
privé en limitant beaucoup les divergences possibles dans les négociations. Ainsi, 
la cueillette en commun et l'échange des données entre les parties devient chose 
possible. Le recours à ces critères rend plus praticable l'acceptation du mécanisme 
de l'arbitrage dans les différends, puisque l'arbitre est, lui aussi, obligé de s'en tenir 
à ces critères. La grève devient ainsi un moyen inopportun et inutile de résoudre 
les différends dans les services publics lorsqu'il existe de meilleures façons de les 
résoudre. 
Le régime apparaîtra ainsi équitable tant aux employés des services publics 
qu'aux contribuables, ce qui est important pour les hommes politiques, car le gou-
vernement peut ainsi avoir sa part de travailleurs compétents et ceux-ci être en 
mesure de voir évoluer leurs traitements selon les changements qui se produisent 
dans le secteur privé. 
Le régime de négociation du gouvernement fédéral a cessé de s'inspirer du 
type de négociation britannique en 1966 en optant pour le concept de la force et 
en négligeant de définir ce qu'il entendait par le « bon » employeur du secteur privé. 
L'île du Prince-Edouard a aussi copié le fort efficace système de consultation 
instituée en Grande-Bretagne en vue de résoudre les questions relatives aux condi-
tions de travail par l'établissement de conseils consultatifs mixtes tant au niveau 
du gouvernement lui-même que des différents ministères. 
Un régime d'arbitrage fondé sur des « comparaisons équitables > peut aussi 
s'appliquer dans les entreprises d'intérêt public, comme les chemins de fer, par exem-
ple, et dans les municipalités ainsi que partout où les entreprises subviennent à leurs 
besoins à même les impôts des contribuables. 
